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decision. It seems that only through experience will the work pro-
duct doctrine become more defined, and its application more uni-
form.
DAVID F. KNUTSON.
SOME NEW CONCEPTS OF
THE JOINT BANK ACCOUNT
Entering a bank, A deposits money in a savings account and in-
structs the teller to list the depost in the passbook and on the bank
records as standing to the account of "A or B." This situation as
well as the equally common situations where deposits are made to
the account of "A and B," "A and/or B," and "A and B or the survi-
vor," as well as other variant forms, presents complex and baffling
questions of law which have lately been engaging the attention of
courts, practitioners, and legal scholars.' The critical inquiry in
most instances is as to the nature of the interests held by A and B
in the funds which have been deposited. Is there a right of survi-
vorship so that if either A or B dies the surviving depositor is en-
titled to all the money? Does B possess a right of present with-
drawal with regard to the funds on deposit? Do the foregoing ar-
rangements violate the Statute of Wills? It is widely agreed that the
answers to these questions depend primarily upon the intention of
the depositor,' but a question may arise as to what evidence is
material to show this intent.- On the other hand, if the dispute
arises over the existence of a right of survivorship, it is possible to
find cases saying that intent to create such a right is insufficient
standing alone, and that compliance with the requirements for cre-
ation of a joint tenancy - i. e., that the joint tenants must share the
unities of time, title, interest, and possession - must also be shown.4
1. See generally Bogert, The Cleation of Trusts by Means of Bank Deposits, 1 Cornell
L. Q. 159 (1916); Jones, The Use of Joint Bank Accounts as a Substitute for Testament-
ary Disposition of Property, 17 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 42 (1955); Kepner, The Joint and Survi-
vorship Bank Account - A Concept Without a Name, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 596 (1953);
Townsend, Creation of Joint Rights Between Husband and Wife in Personal Property, 52
Mich. L. Rev. 779 (1954); 1957 U. Ill. L. F. 655.
2. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 169 Cal. 287, 146 Pac. 647 (1915); In re Murdock's Estate,
238 Iowa 898, 29 N.W.2d 177 (1947); Napier v.. Eigel, 350 Mo. 11, 164 S.W.2d 908
(1942); McGillivray v. First Nat. Bank, 56 N.D. 152, 217 N.W. 150 (1927); Reel v.
Hansboro State Bank, 52 N.D. 182, 201 N.W. 861 (1924); King v. Merryman, 196 Va.
844, 86 S.E.2d 141 (1955).
3. See In re Murdock's Estate, supra, note 2, at 179; Kowal v. Sang, 318 Mich. 312,
28 N.W.2d 113, 117 (1947); Olander v. City of Omaha, 242 Neb. 340, 6 N.W.2d 62,
64 (1942).
4. See Appeal of Garland, 126 Me. 84, 136 Ati. 459, 464 (1927); Wright v. Knapp,
183 Mich. 656, 150 N.W. 315, 316 (1915); In re Gerling's Estate, 303 S.W.2d 915, 917
(Mo. 1957); In re Walker's Estate, 340 Pa. 13, 16 A.2d 28, 29 (1940); In re Lower's
Estate, 48 S.D. 172, 203 N.W. 312, 315 (1925).
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Still other cases declare that whether this technical joint tenancy
has been created is immaterial5 and the fact that the deposit was
entered in the name of A and B, instead of A or B, does not change
the effect of the deposit."
The courts of this country have struggled to discover whether a
joint bank account, sometimes called a "poor man's will,"7 is a
gift, a trust, a contract, a joint tenancy, or a testamentary disposi-
tion.8 Most courts have found it necessary to select one of the
foregoing theories to justify the results reached, 9 and in so doing
may have to rely heavily on extrinsic evidence establishing the in-
tent of the depositor.10
Much of the resulting confusion on this subject stems from an
apparent carry-over of the common law requirements of joint ten-
ancy into that field where, as will presently appear, those require-
ments ate basically inappropriate and unsuited to modern condi-
tions
I. THEORIES OF CREATION OF JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
A. Contract. The courts have employed the contract theory to
achieve two basic results: (1) where the creation of the joint bank
account appears to be a donative transaction, the theory that the
deposit of funds constitutes a contract between donor and bank for
the benefit of the donee and excuses the donor from the necessity of
making actual delivery of the subject-matter of the gift to the
donee;- (2) where both donor and donee sign the deposit card, it
is held that a contract between the two is thereby created and de-
termines their right to the account. "
The first suggested application above supports the survivorship
incident of joint bank accounts on the principle that an inter vivos
gift is present," revocable at any time by and within the lifetime of
the depositor. 4 However, the danger exists that such a transaction
5. In re Baker's Estate, 76 N.W.2d 863 (Iowa 1957); New Jersey Title Guarantee &
Trust Co. v. Archibald, 61 N.J. Eq. 82, 108 Atl. 434 (1919).
6. In re Meehan, 59 App. Div. 156, 69 N.Y.Supp. 9 (1901); see Clary v. Fitzgerald,
155 App. Div. 659, 140 N.Y.Supp. 536, 539 (1913).
7. See In re Edward's Estate, 140 Ore. 431, 14 P.2d 274, 276 (1932).
8. See First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v. Green, 66 N.D. 160, 262 N.W. 596,
597 (1935); Kepner, supra note 1 at, 635.
9. Compare Gray v. Gray, 78 Idaho 439, 304 P.2d 650 (1956), with Hawkins v.
Thackston, 225 S.C. 445, 79 S.E.2d 714 (1954).
10. An example of this is In re Murdock's Estate, 238 Iowa 898, 29 N.W.2d 177 (1947).
11. First Nat. Bank of Aurora v. Mulich, 83 Colo. 528, 266 Pac. 1110 (1928); Castle
v. Wrightman, 303 Mass. 74, 20 N.E.2d 436 (1939); Dunn v. Houghton, 51 Atl. 71
(N.J. Eq. 1902); In re Staver's Estate, 218 Wis. 114, 260 N.W. 655 (1935).
12. Bishop v. Bishop's Ex's, 293 Ky. 652, 170 S.W.2d 1 (1943); Cleveland Trust Co. V.
Scobie, 114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N.E. 373 (1926).
13. Castle v. Wrightman, supra note 11; Dunn v. Houghton, supra note 11.
14. Davis v. Lenawee Co. Savings Bank, 53 Mich. 163, 18 N.W. 629 (1884); see
Dunn v. Houghton, supra note 11 (Power of withdrawal remains in party who retains the
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may be testamentary in nature and thus void under the Statute of
Wills where the donee gets no present interest in the subject-matter
of the gift.'- Many cases have failed because of the donor's ex-
clusive retention of control over the funds.l But the North Da-
kota Court has held that a joint tenancy is not an estate of inheri-
tance, and a joint tenant who dies leaving a surviving tenant has no
interest which he may devise.17
The second suggested application of the contract theory, which
appears the sounder of the two, establishes a contract between the
depositorss with the survivor entitled to the deposit on the basis of
this contract.19 The basic elements of contractual obligations -
offer, acceptance, and consideration -must be shown to establish
the validity of any contract.20 Offer and acceptance in virtually all
instances may be implied as the executory contract, i.e., the account,
must exist before there can be a dispute. As to the problem of
consideration, one court said that the act of depositing is an execu-
tion of the contract, and consideration is dispensed with.2 ' Nova-
tion has been another approach.22
B. Gift. Another theory upon which the validity of a joint bank
account may be asserted supports the survivorship interest on the
ground that an inter vivos gift is a condition precedent. The use of
this type of transfer to create a joint interest in a bank account has
been recognized in a number of jurisdictions. It is a donation of a
partial interest in the form of the present right to withdraw together
with the right of survivorship.23 The donor has as a result of the
gift created a joint interest in the property.24 The cases uniformly
hold that the relinquishment of exclusive control of the account
satisfies the requirement of delivery. They require that there be an
bankbook, and this in effect allows the depositor to revoke donee's interest) "There is no
principle of law which makes the mere placing of money or property in another's name
an irrevocable gift to that person."
15. Appeal of Main, 73 Conn. 638, 48 Atl. 965 (1901); see Manufacturers Nat. Bank
of Detroit v. Schirmer, 303 Mich. 598, 6 N.W.2d 908, 911 (1942); Mardis v. Steen,
293 Pa. 16, 141 Atl. 629, 630 (1928).
16. Davis v. Lenawee Co. Savings Bank, supra note 14; Ruffalo v. Savage, 252 Wis.
175, 31 N.W.2d 175 (1948).
17. In re Kaspari's Estate, 71 N.W2.d 558 (N.D. 1955). Also Hoeffner v. Hoeffner,
389 Ill. 253, 59 N.E.2d 684 (1945).
18. Additional cases along this line are: Chippendale v. North Adams Say. Bank, 222
Mass. 499, 111 N.E. 371 (1915); Sage v. Fluck, 132 Ohio St. 377, 7 N.E.2d 802 (1937);
Tacoma Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Madham, 14 Wash.2d 576, 128 P.2d'982 (1942).
19. In re Mellrath, 276 Ill. App. 408 (1934); see 4 Corbin, Contracts § 783 (1951).
20. See generally 1 Corbin, Contracts, §§ 22-192 (1951).
21. Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie, supra note 12, at 375.
22. Deal's Adm'r v. Merchants & Mechanics Say. Bank, 120 Va. 297, 91 S.E. 135
(1917).
23. State Board of Equalization v. Cole, 122 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d 989 (1948); Burns v.
Nolette, 83 N.H. 489, 144 At. 848 (1929); First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v.
Green, supra note 8.
24. Burns v. Nolette, supra note 23.
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actual delivery where possible,2 5 but in the case of bank accounts
where such delivery is not possible, they require that (1) donative
intent be present accompanied by (2) a symbolical delivery, the de-
livery of the passbook of the savings account to the donee.2, Other
cases hold that the execution of the contract with the bank satisfies
the requirement of delivery.27 There is a close relation between
these cases and adjudications utilizing the contract theory.
North Dakota follows the weight of authority in asserting that
the donor may retain the account, but in order that a valid inter
vivos gift be created, the donee must be given an immediate and
absolute interest therein.2 8 One court has very aptly summarized the
situation by observing that "There can be no doubt that the owner
of personal property has the right to give it away in whole or in
part. Consequently he can give a joint ownership to another."2 1
C. Trust. As has been pointed out, the courts in applying the
gift theory will deny the donee any right to the joint account where
no valid inter vivos gift was created due to want of delivery. But
notwithstanding the failure of delivery the courts have on occasion
sustained the donee's interest on the theory of trust."0 The reason
for the distinction is that the settlor of a trust may by a declaration
of trust create rights in the beneficiary without the additional re-
quirements of delivery necessary in the case of an inter vivos gift."1
Since the settlor has the legal title to the account and is merely
creating an equitable interest in the beneficiary, there is no need
for a transfer of the title; all that is necessary is a declaration of
trust or some act other than the mere deposit 32 all of which are
admissible as evidence in establishing the depositor's intention2 3
It is to be very carefully noted, in order to avoid confusion, that
this deposit does not amount to the typical type of trust as the
lawyer knows it. In other words, it is not a deposit made in trust
for another, i. e., A in trust for B, but rather a joint account upheld
as a trust on the theory that the form of the account shows the in-
25. See, e. g., Beach v. Holland, 172 Ore. 396, 142 P.2d 990, 993 (1943).
26. Beach v. Holland, supra note 25.
27. Perry v. Leveroni, 252 Mass. 390, 147 N.E. 826 (1925); Dunn v. Houghton,
supra note 11.
28. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v. Green, supra note 8.
29. Industrial Trust Co. v. Scanlon, 26 R.I. 228, 58 Atl. 786, 787 (1904).
30. Booth v. Oakland Bank of Savings, 122 Cal. 19, 54 Pac. 370 (1898); Bath Savings
Institution v. Fogg, 101 Me. 188, 63 Atl. 731 (1906); Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212,
43 Atl. 43 (1899); Hoboken Bank for Savings v. Schwoon, 62 N.J. Eq. 503, 50 Atl. 490
(1901).
31. Ibid.
32. See Hoboken Bank for Savings v. Schwoon, supra note 30, at 493; Bogert, supra
note 1.
33. See Powers v. Provident Institution for Savings, 124 Mass. 377, 379 (1878); Ho-
boken Bank for Savings v. Schwoon, supra note 30, at 493; Scott, Trusts § 58.1 (1939).
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tent to give a donee an equitable interest therein, e. g., A in trust
for A and B, joint owners, subject to order of either, the balance
at death of either to belong to the survivor." It is to be observed
that the depositor's withholding of the bank book allows him to con-
trol the fund, even though the beneficiary is a joint owner.3 5 That
the depositor occupies a close relationship to the beneficiary may
be considered as having some evidentiary value in favor of trust
intent.36
The greatest obstacle to the creation of such a trust in a joint
bank account is its testamentary character. It is true that an inter-
est must pass to the beneficiary before the death of the trustee;
otherwise a trust is invalid for failure to meet the requirements of
the Statute of Wills.3 7  Equally, where the trustee transfers prop-
erty in trust and reserves a beneficial life interest as well as a power
to control, modify, and revoke the trust, it must fail as being testa-
mentary."
For this reason, the trust was condemmed in some cases as vio-
lative of the Statutes of Wills. 9
Generally speaking, however, the joint bank account in trust has
been sustained on the reasoning that a present interest is given to
the beneficiary.40  But the Restatement of Trusts41 takes a more
realistic view in recognizing that an exception to the normal rule is
being employed in such cases to satisfy the demands of social policy.
The exception is based on a policy of allowing such a settlor to con-
trol small sums of money during life and yet dispose of them with-
out meeting the formalities of the Statute of Wills.
One writer has suggested that the most serious objection to the
trust theory is the fact that had the depositor actually desired to
34. This form has been upheld by a number of courts, and is probably a proper form
for use by attorneys.
35. E. g., Milholland v. Whalen, supra note 30, wherein A had opened a savings ac-
count in X bank with the following entry: "X bank, in account with A. In trust for her-
self and B, joint owners, subject to the order of either; the balance at the death of either
to belong to the survivor." The bankbook was retained by A and she drew out various
during her life. The court held that B had a survivorship interest. So A was allowed to
set up a device by which she controlled the fund during her lifetime, and yet at her
death it belonged to the co-owner.
36. See Meislohn v. Meislohn, 56 App. Div. 566, 67 N.Y.Supp. 480, 482 (1900)
(child); Harrison v. Totten, 53 App. Div. 178, 65 N.Y.Supp. 725, 726 (1900) (grand-
niece).
37. Restatement, Trusts § 56 (1935).
38. Id. at § 57(3).
39. Springdale Nat. Bank v. Ward, 122 Me. 227, 119 At. 529 (1923); Nicklas v.
Parker, 69 N.J. Eq. 743, 61 Ati. 267 (1905).
40. This seems to be the view of the Maryland 2ases. See Scott, Trusts §§ 56.6, 57.6
(11939).
41. § 58 (1935).
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create a trust, he could have opened the account in trust form,
rather than in joint and survivorship form. 42
D. Joint Tenancy. The phrase "joint tenancy," when applied to
joint bank accounts, means different things in different jurisdictions
depending upon the status of this particular estate in the jurisdic-
tion involved. In those jurisdictions which maintain the common
law form of joint tenancy, a joint bank account will not constitute
the depositors joint tenants, inasmuch as the four unities of time,
title, interest, and possession must be shown before a joint tenancy
may be created. 3
These courts point out that the source of the title of the donor and
time of acquisition appear to be different from that of the donee. 4
While it may be argued that a deposit in the names of donor and
donee amounts to a conveyance and reconveyance, a device used to
meet the requirements of unity of time and title, these courts im-
pliedly repudiate this argument. Since even in the event of a change
in a bank deposit, the novation by the bank in acknowledging a joint
obligation when previously its obligations was several does not con-
stitute the sources of either the donor or donee's title."
A more serious objection to the common law form of joint ten-
ancy is that there is no real unity of interest.4 6 This is true in the
cases in which the depositor shows that he did not intend to make
a gift of the account, and that the account was in joint form for the
depositor's own convenience.47
It should be observed, however, that the number of jurisdictions
which require the traditional four unities in the creation of joint
bank accounts has declined noticeably in recent years. Examination
reveals four types of legislation which have been enacted in regard
to joint tenancies:
(1) The type in which the opening of a joint and survivorship
account creates a joint tenancy.4 8
(2) The type under which a conveyance to two or more persons
creates a tenancy in common, unless intent is found to create a
42. Kepner, supra note 1, at 599.
43. Appeal of Garland, supra note 4 [modified by statute, Me. Rev. Stat. c. 59 § 40
(1954)]; In re Lower's Estate, supra note 4 [modified by statute, S.D. Code c. 51.0212
(1960 Supp.)].
44. See Appeal of Garland, supra note 4, at 465; In re Lower's Estate, supra note 4,
at 315.
45. See, e. g., Appeal of Garland, supra note 4, at 465.
46. This argument is used in Staples v. Berry, 110 Me. 32, 85 Atl. 303, 305 (1912).
47. In such an event a bank may by virtue of a bank protection statute permit with-
drawals by either of the named persons without liability. This type of statute does not
fix property rights between the parties, but exists merely for the protection of the bank.
North Dakota banks are given this protection by N.D. Cent. Code § 6-03-66 (1961).
48. Ark. "Stat. § 67-521 (1947); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 362.470' (1949); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 663.010 (1959).
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joint tenancy.4" This type of statute creates a presumption against
joint tenancy, but does not prohibit it."
(3) The type under which the right of survivorship as an inci-
dent to joint tenancy is abolished." However, intent to create the
right of survivorship will be honored under this type of statute. 52
(4) The type which has totally abolished the joint tenancy.53
Under this type of statute, right of survivorship must be expressed 4
on the theory that the parties are tenants in common for life, with
remainder to the survivor 55
As a general rule, if a joint tenancy is recognized in realty it will
also exist in the case of personalty. Conversely if it is not recog-
nized in realty it will be found not to exist with regard to per-
sonalty. 6
It is readily seen after studying these varient forms of statutes
that legislation has generally supplanted the unities, and relies in-
stead on the depositor's intent for the purpose of creating a joint
tenancy."
E. A New Concept. The objections to the aforestated theories
have been summarized as follows by Kepner: "The joint bank ac-
count does not qualify as a common law gift, because the donor
does not surrender dominion. It is not a trust, because there is on
intention on the part of the depositor to enter into such relationship.
Neither is it a common law joint tenancy, because the four unities
essential for creating this joint interest are lacking. While the parties
may enter into a contract providing for the payment of the funds,
the contract itself does not operate as a conveyance of the funds
from one joint payee to the other joint payee. It is not a will, be-
cause it does not comply with the statutory formalities.
"The joint and survivorship bank account transaction is a combi-
nation of all of the methods of transferring property listed in the
49. See infra, note 65. As seen, North Dakota has adopted this type of statute.
50. Crabtree v. Garcia, 43 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1949); In re Fast's Estate, 169 Kan. 238,
218 P.2d 184 (1950).
51. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-204 (1956); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41.2 (1950); Ore. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 70-205 (1940); Tenn. Code § 64-107 (1956); Wash. Rev. Code ch. 11.04,
.070 (1957); W.Va. Code 88 3539, 3540 (1955).
52. Beach v. Holland, supra note 25.
53. Ga. Code Ann. § 85-1002 (1955); see Blodgatt v. Union & New Haven Trust Co.,
111 Conn. 165, 149 Al. 790, 791 (1930); Berberick v. Courtade, 137 Ohio St. 297, 28
N.E.2d 636, 638 (1940); Foracker v. Kocks, 41 Ohio App. 210, 180 N.E. 743, 745
(1931).
54. See Foracker v. Kocks, supra note 53, at 745.
55. See Blodgett v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., supra note 53, at 791.
56. See Kepner, supra note 1, at 602.
57. It should be noted that Me. Rev. Stat. c. 168, § 13 (1954) provides that all of the
attributes and incidents of a common law joint tenancy are retained. But c. 59, § 40
makes an exception thereto; viz., all joint accounts opcned in banks, savings banks, and
trust companies will be honored although technical joint tenancies are not in law or fact
created.
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preceding theories. It partakes of the nature of a gift because it is
gratuitous. It is like a will in that the beneficiary is not certain of
the amount of the donation until the depositor's death. It is similar
to a joint tenancy because of the creation of joint interest. It has
some of the characteristics of a revocable trust. Since the joint ac-
count combines in part all the features of gifts, wills, joint tenancies,
and revocable trusts it is a new concept possessing independent
characteristics of its own. It should be recognized as such."5 8
II. PROPERTY PURCHASE WITH JOINT FUNDS
The case of In Re Harris9 states that personal property acquired
with funds held in joint tenancy retains the same character (is held
in joint tenancy) in the absence of an agreement indicating a dif-
ferent intention. The Harris doctrine has been followed with some
consistency,6" though not without misgivings,61 particularly in Cali-
fornia where it originated and also in other jurisdictions.12 This
doctrine apparently has become a rule of property in California. 3
There is a distinction if the property purchased is real or per-
sonal. In re Harris' Estate 4 points out that when real property is
purchased with joint tenancy funds, each party owns an interest in
the realty as his separate property, thus they become tenants in com-
mon of the land. The Harris decision offers no explanation for this
reeult, but the codes themselves reveal the answer. Most states
have enacted statutes providing that a grant or devise to two or
more persons creates a tenancy in common unless an intent to create
a joint tenancy is expressly declared.6 5 Further, an estate of joint
58. Kepner, supra note 1, at 635.
59. 169 Cal. 725, 147 Pac. 967 (1915); in support of this contention the court relied
upon an earlier decision, Kennedy v. Kennedy, 169 Cal. 287, 146 Pac. 647 (1915), that
held that the intent of the parties should supercede all other factors in establishing sur-
vivorship.
60. In re Hoelfin's Estate, I Cal. Rptr. 942 (1960); Security-First Nat. Bank of Los
Angeles v. Stack, 32 Cal. App.2d 586, 90 P.2d 337 (1939) (where an argument to the
contrary existed); Wallace v. Riley, 23 Cal.App.2d 654, 74 P.2d 807 (1937); In re
Harris' Estate, 9 Cal.2d 649, 72 P.2d 873 (1937).
61. See generally 28 Calif. L. Rev. 224 (1940).
62. Hahn v. Ironbound Trust Co., 94 N.J. Eq. 123, 118 Atl. 744 (1922). Accord,
Harrellson v. Barks, 326 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. 1959).
63. Lager v. Erickson, 13 Cal. App.2d 365, 56 P.2d 1287 (1936) (Concurring Opinion).
64. 9 Cal.2d 649, 72 P.2d 873 (1939). See also 28 Calif. L. Rev. 224 (1940).
65. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-431 (1956); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 50-411 (1947); Cal. Civ.
Code § 683 (1956); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 118-2-1 (1953); D.C. Code § 45-816 (1940);
Del. Code Ann. § 25-701 (1953); Fla. Stat. § 689.15 (1959); Hawaii Rev. Code §
12781 (1945); Idaho Code § 55-104 (1949); Il1. Rcv. Stat. ch. 76, § 1 (1945); Ind.
Stat. Ann. § 56-111 (Burns 1951); Iowa Code Ann. § 557.15 (1950); Kan. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 58-501 (Supp. 1959); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 381.130 (1953); Me. Rev. Stat. ch. 168,
§ 13 (1954); Md. Code Ann. art. 50 § 13 (Flack 1951); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 184, § 7
(1958); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 554.44 (1948); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 500.19-2 (1947); Miss.
Code § 834 (1942); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 442.450 (1949); Mont. Rev. Code § 67-310 (1947);
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 111.060 (1957); N.J. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:3-17 (1937); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 70-1-14 (1953); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 66; N.D. Cent. Code §§ 47-02-06,
47-02-08 (1961); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 93.180. 105.820 (1957); R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-3-1
tenancy in realty cannot be created by oral agreement,"6 as may be
the case in personal property.6 7
A joint bank account may not be terminated except by mutual
agreement of the parties,68 and withdrawal by one cotenant without
the consent of the other, does not change the interest of the others.69
Since the interest is not destroyed, the residue," and the withdrawn
funds if used for a common benefit, 71 should retain the character-
istics of the joint fund and belong to both.72 The case of Armbrus-
tcr v. Armbruster3 points out that if the parties had a joint interest
in a bank account, they ought to have a like interest in property
in which the joint funds are invested, if nothing else appears, and
would negative the idea that such withdrawals were severed from
the joint estate. If the funds used to purchase personal property
can be traced to the original account, then the personal property
purchased retains the same characteristics as the joint account. 7
Htowever, a cotenant withdrawing funds for the purpose of mis-
appropriating them necessarily destroys the joint tenancy in the
process. 75 A party may withdraw a moiety of the funds without
accountability; if more is withdrawn, the other party has the right
to follow the funds withdrawn or the property purchased.76 How-
ever, the intent or understanding of the parties, as gathered from
all the circumstances, is controlling, and consent may thus appear
to withdrawal of a portion of the fund and investment in the name
of one of the parties. Such consent will preclude the following of
the funds withdrawn. 7
III. TAXATION OF JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
A. Federal Gift Tax. As has been shown, a gift of money may
be placed in a bank account for the joint benefit of donor and donee,
(1956); S.D. Code § 51-0214 (1939); Utah Stat. Ann. § 57-1-5 (1953); Vt. Codr Ann.
§ 18-3401 (1953); Va. Code §§ 55-20, 21 (1950); W. Va. Code § 3539, 40 (1955);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 230.44 (1957).
66. Wheeland v. Rogers, 20 Cal.2d 218, 124 P.2d 816 (1942) (Discussing stztute).
67. Opp v. Frye, 70 Cal.App. 478, 161 P.2d 235 (1945).
68. Siemewski v. Union State Bank of South Chicago, 242 Ill.App. 390 (1926).
69. Waters v. Nevis, 31 Cal.App. 511, 160 Pac. 1081 (1916); when one cotenant
withdraws funds from a joint account, he becomes an agent of the other, In re Culhane's
Estate, 334 Pa. 124, 5 A.2d 377 (1939); In re Schley's Estate, 271 Wis. 74, 72 N.W.2d
767 (1955).
70. Commercial Trust Co. v. White, 89 N.J. Eq. 119, 132 Atl. 761 (1926).
71. Werle v. Werle, 332 Pa. 49, 1 A.2d 244 (1938).
72. Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings & Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 200 Atl. 624 (1938).
73. 326 Mo. 51, 31 S.W.2d 28 (1930). Accordingly, if joint tenancy property is sold,
the proceeds, in absence of contrary intention, retain the characteristics of the property
from which they were acquired. Fish v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 31 Cal.2d 378, 189
P.2d 10 (1948).
74. Crowell v. Milligan, 157 Neb. 127, 59 N.W. 346 (1953).
75. In re Sutter's Estate, 245 N.Y. Supp. 636 (1930).
76. Jackenthal v. Jackenthal, 139 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1955).
77. Dickson v. Jonesboro Trust Co., 154 Ark. 155, 242 S.W. 57 (1922).
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and that such a gift may be supported as an inter vivos gift78 or a
gift in trust form ° depending upon the intent of the depositor. Such
a gift of intangible personal property is complete to give the donee
an interest either when the contract was entered into"° or when the
bankbook was delivered to the donee. 81 The question then arises
as to how and when the gift tax is applied to the donation.
The main purpose of the gift tax law is to compensate for the
estate tax that would have been payable on the donor's death. The
theory is that if the gift had not been made, the property given
would have constituted part of the donor's taxable estate when he
died. 8
2
Section 2511 of the Internal Revenue Code provides "that the gift
imposed shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise,
whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is
real or personal, tangible or intangible.8- The joint bank account
is clearly within the all-inclusive terms of this code provision, as
illustrated by the following example: "if A creates a joint bank ac-
count for himself and B (or similar type of ownership by which A
can regain the entire fund without B's consent), there is a gift to B
when B draws upon the account to his own benefit, to the extent of
the amount drawn without any obligation to account for a part of
the proceeds to A."84 It is obvious that 'the evil which the regulation
is aimed to preclude is the assertion of liability to payment of a gift
tax when no gift was effectuated, as in the case where the entire
fund was withdrawn by the donor.
The same principle applies to a gift in trust form. Hence, if a
donor transfers property to himself as trustee and retains no bene-
ficial interest in the trust property and no power over it to change
the beneficiary, then the gift is complete and is subject to gift
tax.85 Conversely, when the donor retains power of revocation, i. e.,
power to change the beneficiary, then the gift tax is not payable.86
Where the question arising in gift tax litigation is whether there
has been a completed gift inter vivos, the court must correlate the
78. Burns v. Nolette, supra note 23.
79. Milholland v. Whalen, supra note 30.
80. Castle v. Wrightman, supra note 11; Perry v. Leveroni, supra note 27; Dunn v.
Houghton, supra note 11.
81. Beach v. Holland, supra note 25.
82. 3 P-H 1960 Fed. Tax. Serv. 125,010.
83. The tax is a personal liability on the donor, is an excise upon his act of making the
transfer, and is measured by the value of the property conveyed. Galt v. Conmissioner,
216 F.2d 41, 51 (7th Cir. 1954).
84. Treas. Reg. § 25-2511-1(h)-4 (1959); Commissioner v. Walston, 168 F.2d 211
(4th Cir. 1948).
85. Treas. Reg. § 25-2511-2(g) (1959).
86. Treas. Reg. § 25-2511-2(c) (1959).
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gift tax with the estate tax, and if the gift is incomplete from the
viewpoint of the estate tax it must be regarded as incomplete for
purposes of the gift tax.87 To illustrate, a gift tax need never be
paid where the value of the account was included in A's estate and
an estate tax was paid on it.
B. North Dakota Gift Tax. There is no gift tax imposed in North
Dakota.88
C. Federal Estate Tax. It is apparent that if joint estates were
not subject to the estate or succession tax, an owner of property
could avoid the tax by having his property transferred to himself
and those who would otherwise be his legatees and devisees as joint
owners with the right of survivorship.
The pertinent provisions of the Internal Revenue Code in ref-
erence to estate taxes on joint interests provide:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all prop-
erty to the extent of the interest therein held as joint tenants by
the decedent and any other person, or deposited, with any person
carrying on the banking business, in their joint names and payable
to either or the survivor, except such part thereof as any be shown
to have originally belonged to such other person and never to
have been received by the latter from the decedent for less than
an adequate and full consideration: Provided, that where such
property or any part thereof, or part of the consideration with
which such property was acquired by such other person from the
decedent for less than an adequate and full consideration, there
shall be excepted only such part of the value of such property as
is proportionate to the consideration furnished by such other per-
son: Provided Further, that where any property has been acquired
by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance, by the decedent and any
other persons as joint tenants, then to the extent of the value of a
fraction part to be determined by dividing the value of the prop-
erty by the number of joint tenants.89 [Emphasis added.]
To illustrate: if A, the decedent, (donee) has given consideration
for one-half the value of the account, such one-half value shall be
included in his estate. If A has not given any consideration, no part
of the value of the account shall be included in his gross estate.
If A, B, and C are joint tenants as a result of a devise, bequest,
gift, or inheritance from D, then A, the decedent, will have included
in his estate one-third of the value of the account.
Int. Rev. Code § 2040 specifically covers a deposit of money
held jointly.9 °
87. Higgins v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1942).
88. 2 CCH 1960 Inl., Est. & Gift Tax Rep. (7th ed.) 2600.
89. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 2040.
90. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(b) (1959).
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D. North Dakota Estate Tax. The North Dakota Code provides
that:
"The gross estate of a decedent shall include the value of
interests in property held as a joint tenant, or deposited in banks
or other institutions in the joint names of the decedent and any
other person, and payable to either or the survivor. In any such
case the value of the decedent's interest shall be determined by
dividing the value of the entire property by the number of joint
tenants, joint depositors, or persons interested therein.""'
This provision is supplemented by a regulation, however, where-
in it is stated that estate tax is imposed only "provided the de-
cedent contributed toward the acquisition of property so held or
deposited or acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance." 2
North Dakota law would seem to correspond to the Internal
Revenue Code in that a determination should be made as to the
amount of contribution made by a decedent in assessing the pro-
portion of the account which should be included in a decedent's
estate for tax purposes. Whether this regulation is valid, however,
seems unsettled. This is illustrated by In re Berzers Estate,3 where
the Supreme Court of North Dakota included one-half of the value
of a joint account in a decedent's gross estate for tax purposes as
dictated by the terms of the North Dakota Code. The court, in its
opinion, made no mention of contribution under the regulation
aforestated.
It follows that when a decedent has made a gift in trust and has
reserved power to change the beneficiary the entire account is in-
cluded in his estate. "Whenever a decedent has reserved unrestrict-
ed power of revocation of any trust created during his lifetime, such
trust shall be considered as part of his estate and shall be taxed ac-
cordingly. '" 94
The decedent may transfer his interest during his life as an inter
vivos gift. In such an event, no part of the interest previously held
is includible in his gross estate for tax purposes.9
This transfer must, however, be made over two years prior to
death or it may be considered a gift in contemplation of death and
consequently will be includible in the gross estate," in the absence
of showing that the gift was not in contemplation of death.
91. N.D. Cent. Code § 57-37-06 (1961).
92. 2 CCH 1960 Inh., Est. & Gift Tax Rep. (7th ed.) 1570.
93. 101 N.W.2d 557 (N.D. 1960).
94. N.D. Cent. Code § 57-37-08 (1961).
95. Littlejohn v. County Judge, Pembina County, 79 N.D. 550, 58 N.W.2d 278 (1953).
96. N.D. Cent. Code § 57-37-04 (1961).
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IV. CONCLUSION: NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
One author has suggested that legislation be passed requiring de-
positors to provide on each deposit card or certificate in prominent
language and understandable terms the legal effects of a joint and
survivorship account.97 The first form would provide that only the
donor could withdraw funds from the account, and upon his death
the residue of the account would vest with the survivor. The second
form would be essentially an account for the benefit and conve-
nience of the depositor, but there would be no survivorship clause,
and the balance of the account would go to the donor's estate upon
his death. The third form would allow both tenants to withdraw,
with the balance of the account to go to the survivor. This last form
is in general use today. By using the three separate and distinct
forms, the donor's intent would be more easily ascertainable, al-
though use of a form would not necessarily be conclusive, and the
courts would still have authority to find a different intent on the
part of the depositor if necessary.
Another solution advanced is the adoption of the Model Joint
Bank Account Statute.9" This act would replace the many different
and conflicting statutes within the present day codes and would give
certainty to the laws of joint bank accounts.
The joint and survivorship bank account is a new technique for
transfering property. It needs a new name so that it will not be
confused with the common law joint tenancy. By renaming the ac-
count, the law would be relatively free of the confusion caused by
common law technicalities. At presc-nt it is improbable that the
donor can insure ownership of funds in the surviving donee upon
the donor's death. The need for corrective legislation is apparent,




MODEL JOINT BANK ACCOUNT STATUTE
Section 1. This act shall be known as the Joint Bank Account
Gift Law.
Section 2. A deposit made in any banking institution doing
business in this state, in the names of two or more persons and pay-
able to either or the survivor, may be paid to either during their
97. Jones, supra note I, at 52.
98. Kepner, supra note 1, at 636. See appendix for complete reproduction of the Model
Joint Bank Account Statute.
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joint lives and to the survivor upon the death of either. The re-
ceipt or acquittance of the person so paid shall be a valid release
and discharge to the bank for any payment so made.
Section 3. The opening of the account in joint and survivorship
form, upon written application of the depositor, witnessed by an
officer or authorized employee of the bank, shall in the absence of
fraud, undue influence or lack of mental capacity on the part of the
depositor, be conclusive evidence of the depositor's intention to
make a gift to the survivor of the balance remaining in the account
at the depositor's death.
Section 4. The person furnishing the funds for the account may
withdraw any of such funds during his lifetime, free from any
claims of the depositor, except such claims that may arise by reason
of a rule of law other than expressed in this act.
Section 5. Deposits in a joint and survivorship account shall be
subject to the debts of either party to the extent that such depositor
has contributed to the account.
Section 6. A joint and survivorship account is not severed by a
judicial declaration of incompetency. A guardian of either of the
parties may withdraw from the account up to the total amount that
his ward has contributed to the account; provided such funds are
needed for the ward's maintenance; and provided further that the
ward has no other property that may be used without causing hard-
ship to a spouse, parent, brother or sister or other person depend-
ent upon the ward for support.
Section 7. For the purpose of determining the statutory rights
of a surviving spouse, any funds that shall pass to the survivor upon
the death of the party furnishing the funds shall be treated as
though the survivor acquired the balance of a specific devise in the
depositor's will.
Section 8. A deposit made in the name of two persons, payable
to either, but which makes no provision for survivorship, may be
paid to either until the death of the depositor, and thereafter to the
depositor's estate. -The receipt or acquittance of. the person so paid
shall be a valid release, and discharge to the bank for any payment
so made, provided such payment is made before the receipt of a
written notice from the depositor or a legal representative of his
estate notifying the bank not to pay.
Section 9. The opening of the account in joint form without a
provision for survivorship shall be conclusive evidence, in the ab-
sence of fraud or mistake, of the depositor's intention to open the
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account for his convenience only, and not for the purpose of making
a gift to the co-depositor. The funds shall belong exclusively to the
depositor, subject only to claims arising under other rules of law.
Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit a reformation of
the account upon a showing of fraud or mistake.
Section 10. The law shall apply to all accounts opened subse-
quent to its adoption. A depositor may subject an account opened
prior to the date of this law to the provisions of this act by execut-
ing a new signature card, witnessed by an officer or authorized em-
ployee, on any day after the adoption of this law.
Section 11. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this act
are hereby repealed.
Section 12. This act shall become effective immediately.
THE NORTH DAKOTA SMALL LOANS ACT
In an outburst of commercial recognition uncommon to this agri-
cultural state the legislature of North Dakota in its 1959 session
brought forth a series of measures concerning the regulation of con-
sumer credit. The hastily drawn Retail Installment Sales Act, passed
during the 1957 session, was comprehensively amended.1 A measure
was enacted regulating one of the newer commercial innovations,
the revolving charge account,2 and the small loan industry of North
Dakota was legalized under a North Dakota Small Loans Act."
This article will concern itself with the latter enactment, and with
the background and history necessitating its passage.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
The small loan business, or the preferred term since it has reached
maturity - the consumer finance industry - has become an import-
ant factor in the economy of the United States. As of July 1960 its
outstanding credits totaled over four billion dollars.4 While this
shows an amazing increase over the past several decades keeping
pace with general installment credit,' the rate of increase at present
indicates a leveling off and financial maturity.'
Much of the credit for the development of the neighborhood
1. N.D. Laws 1959, c. 268, amending N.D. Rev. Code J 51-13 (1957 Supp.). The
original was apparently based on a motor vehicle statute and expanded to include all
goods, making for incongruities and commercially inapplicable sections.
2. N.D. Laws 1959, c. 350 (service charge not to exceed 1%9 per month on the
outstanding indebtedness).
3. N.D. Laws 1959, c. 136.
4. Financial and Business Statistics, Fed. Reserve Bull., Sept. 1960. p. 1047. Out-
standing installment credit among consumer finance companies totals $4,035,000,000.
5. Ibid.
6. Consumer Credit Expansion, Fed. Reserve Bull., April 1960, p. 3.
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